THE JUVENILE COURT: CONTRADICTORY
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Depending on one's historical perspective, the juvenile court has had either a short
or long span of existence. Its history has been short when one attempts to survey
the numerous tribunals which have been directed to the task of securing justice for
men under some system of law. On the other hand, in the light of the earliest legal
attempt to define the juvenile delinquent, it has had a relative long history, covering
more than a fourth of this period. From the latter perspective, sufficient time has
elapsed to justify a closer, more critical look at what the juvenile court is, what it
does, and what it has accomplished.
In this analysis, there are five central objectives. First, the history of the juvenile
court and the interacting social forces that have produced it will briefly be considered.
Second, the image of the juvenile court that has developed from the implementation
of reformistic ideals will be portrayed. Third, another image of the juvenile court,
as derived from the traditional view of the law, will be constructed. Fourth, some
of the consequences and problems that have resulted from the conflict of these two
images will be discussed. And finally, some opportunities will be suggested for the
juvenile court today. Such an analysis, it is felt, will illuminate not only what the
juvenile court is, what it does, what it has accomplished, but perhaps where it is
going.
I
EVENTS AND FORCES FORMING THE JUVENILE COURT

The historical origin of the juvenile court is, no doubt, sufficiently familiar to the
readers of this symposium to warrant but a brief recapitulation. While the first law
defining juvenile delinquency was passed by the Illinois legislature in April X899, 1
and the juvenile court itself began functioning in June of that year, its founding
had been amply anticipated by certain legalistic precedents in equity and criminal
law. More specifically, from the English courts of chancery or equity, the principle
of parens patriaehad evolved in the case of Eyre v. Shaftsbury in 1772.2 This principle, which enabled the court to act in lieu of parents who were deemed unwilling
or unable to perform their proper parental functions, paved the way for the juvenile
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court to assume jurisdiction of dependent and neglected children. Even before this
decision, however, the doctrine that the state under certain conditions had to act as
a protector of minors had long been a part of the common law
But it is in dealing with delinquent children that the criminal law origins of the
juvenile court are of significance. It had long been an accepted principle of the
common law that a child under seven years of age could not commit a criminal act
because he could not have mens rea, a guilty mind From here, it was logical next
to question the responsibility of children above seven years of age, and in so doing,
the juvenile court law has been regarded merely as extending the application of a
common-law principle.
Another development anticipating the juvenile court was the inauguration of probation as a device for dealing with offenders. This practice, initiated in Boston in
1841,' which included from the beginning adult as well as juvenile offenders, early
highlighted some of the special protections that a child needed when brought before
a court of law.
One other development which paved the way for the juvenile court was the
establishment of special institutions for confining child offenders. The first institution for juvenile delinquents, the House of Refuge, in New York City, opened on
January I, 1825, and by i86o, sixteen of such institutions had been opened in the
United States.8 These responded to the need long-felt by the reform element in
American society that a child who had been convicted of violating a law should not
be confined with hardened adult criminals in jails and penitentiaries, where, it was believed, only further demoralization and corruption could ensue. Even so, up to the
first quarter of the twentieth century, children were still being punished by incarceration in institutions designed for adults.
Thus, it is seen that early legal precedents, the development of probation, and
the establishment of special institutions for juvenile offenders anticipated the first
juvenile court in Illinois, which was to become the prototype for legal tribunals
dealing with children whose behavior or situation indicated positive state intervention. The concept of the juvenile court spread quickly and was favorably
received throughout the country. Indeed, by 1923, all states, with the exception of
Connecticut and Wyoming, had enacted legislation defining a juvenile delinquent
and establishing a special court for hearing children's cases; and by the early 1940's,

even the two hold-out states had come into compliance with this trend.
While these historical events define the establishment of the juvenile court, in
a broader cultural sense, it can be regarded as the product of such social forces as
our humanitarianism, on the one hand, and the growth of cities, on the other.
The force of humanitarianism is well symbolized in the personalities of those
women, Jane Addams and Julia Lathrop in Illinois, who agitated for the first
3 See
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juvenile court law. The high principles and unselfish motives which fired these
women played a positive role in giving to the juvenile court, from its inception,
the stamp of a social agency for dealing with a maladjusted child, rather than that
of a punitive court attempting to exact retribution.
The rapid growth of cities, which characterized not only the United States, but
the world in the nineteenth century, was also a significant factor. In i8oo, there
was no city with a population of iooooo in the United States, but by i9oo, there
m7 This urbanization
were thirty-seven.
was a product of the factory system plus improvements in agricultural technology. The cities grew not so much through
natural increase, as through vast movements of people thereto from rural areas and
from various European countries seeking jobs, opportunities, and a new life.
Most of these European migrants faced new and untested situations in the slum
environments of our large cities. Their children, often caught in the conflict between
European peasant values and the values reflected in American institutions, responded
in delinquent ways and began to flood the jails, reformatories, and courts. Their
parents, handicapped by language difficulties, were unable to comprehend or cope
with these situations, and this tended to foster certain unforeseen functions of the
emerging juvenile court, such as aiding the process of immigrant family adjustment,
serving as an educational agency in American values, and often protecting the
child from demoralizing home situations.
A. Definitions
Some difficulty has been experienced in determining exactly what the juvenile
court is and what a juvenile delinquent is. The difficulty in defining the juvenile
court stems from the fact that it is usually attached to a probate or county court
and is generally of limited jurisdiction. Thus, while each state now has a juvenile
court, its organization and the policies governing it vary markedly throughout the
country. While most large cities have a court presided over by a special judge
that is devoted exclusively to the processing of cases involving children, many
rural counties merely have the probate judge change hats when hearing children's
cases. In some jurisdictions, the juvenile court judge is appointed; in many other
jurisdictions, he is an elected official. A few judges have looked upon the juvenile
court judgeship as a career; others have seen it merely as a step in an upward political
climb. Some judges take a human, personal interest in the children brought before
them; others merely handle the cases within the framework of the law. Some
juvenile courts, particularly those in large cities, have a staff of trained professionals,
probation officers, social workers, psychologists, statisticians; others have hardly any.
In some juvenile courts, the probation officers are trained social workers; in others,
their professional training is minimal. In some juvenile courts, these professionals
are under civil service and have tenure; in others, they are largely personal and
political appointments. Some juvenile courts work closely with the numerous social
7See U.S. DEP'T OF STArE, CENSUS OFFICE, SECOND CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES (iSO); U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT oF THE UNITED STATES (1957).
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agencies dealing with children; others have little or no contact with such agencies.
Three types of juvenile courts which have emerged in the various states have
been identified. First, in most counties, other courts have jurisdiction over juvenile
cases as well, and when hearing such cases they are referred to as juvenile courts.
Second, there are some juvenile courts which are separate and divorced completely
from other courts; these are usually found in counties with large cities. Finally,
some juvenile courts are tied to special courts that handle selected social-problem
cases, such as divorce and truancy, although there also has been a tendency to place
such social-problem cases in juvenile courts which have an independent organization-a practice that has engendered certain support for a so-called family court.
A recent survey shows that in some forty states, jurisdiction is overlapping
between the general criminal and juvenile courts. It is noted that the provision for
alternate authority is related to the seriousness of the offense and/or the maturity of
the child-defendant. The interpretive remarks on this matter are most relevant:8
Practice belies the motives which have supported the child welfare movement, revealing
the limitations of our humanitarianism. More specifically, it points up the emphasis
which our legal system continues to place upon incapacitation and deterrence-the pro-

tection of the public even at the expense of the child. In part, it may reflect too, the
feeling that a fuller and more careful hearing should be given to serious cases than the
juvenile court ordinarily provides.
When one turns to the definition of a juvenile delinquent, there is not so much
variation as in the case of the juvenile court. All states have laws which, although
varying in wording, show a common core of agreement in this regard. Thus, a child
is uniformly considered delinquent if he acts in such a way as to violate a local
ordinance or state law. In addition, most states further include such acts or conditions as "habitual truancy from school," "knowingly associating with thieves, vicious
or immoral persons," "incorrigibility," "beyond control of parent or guardian," and
"growing up in idleness and crime." These are only a few of the thirty-four items
commonly found in the laws defining juvenile delinquency in the several states?
In general, state laws defining delinquency have moved from the specific to the
generic. Accordingly, the legislation that established the juvenile court in Illinois
defined a delinquent as "any child under the age of sixteen years who has violated
any law of the state or any city or village ordinance."'" This concise statement
contrasts markedly with the later New York legislation which defines a delinquent
1

as:'

child over seven and under sixteen years of age (a) who violates any law of... this
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...a

' Tappan, Children and Youth in the Criminal Court, 261
"See

FREDERmcK

B.

Suss.IAN,

LAW

O

STATES 20 (1950).

"Ill. Laws i899, p.

137.

'2N.Y.C. Dom. REL. CT. Acr § 2 (15).

ANNALS 128, 132 (1947).
JuvENiLE DELINQUENCY: TkE LAws oF TH

FORTr-EIGir

512

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

imprisonment; (b) who is incorrigible, ungovernable, or habitually disobedient and beyond
the control of his parents, guardian, custodian or other lawful authority; (c) who is
habitually truant; (d) who without just cause and without the consent of his parent,

guardian or other custodian deserts his home or place of abode; (e) who engages in any
occupation which is in violation of the law; (f) who begs or who solicits alms or money
in public places; (g) who associates with immoral or vicious persons; (h) who frequents
any place the maintenance of which is in violation of law; (i) who habitually uses obscene
or profane language; or (j) who so deports himself as wilfully to injure or endanger the
morals or health of himself or others.
Another observable trend has been the strengthening of the role of the juvenile
court by assuring it wider jurisdiction over children's cases and by emphasizing that
the child is not on trial for a specific crime. But some decisions contain language
to the effect that the child's constitutional rights are to be assured through right of
appeal-even though this right is seldom exercised in the juvenile court; 2 and this
matter has provided one of the principal foci for criticism of the juvenile court.
Some judges and lawyers have maintained that the juvenile court in operation
practically subverts the "due process" clause of the constitution in its zeal to apply
the doctrine of parens patriae.
In addition to the generally diffuse manner in which they define delinquency,
state laws differ markedly with respect to fixing the maximum legal age of a
delinquent, varying from sixteen to twenty-one, with seventeen being the most
common.

In summary, then, it should be noted that juvenile delinquency is a broad generic
term which embraces many diverse forms of antisocial behavior of the child and
which is defined somewhat differently in the various states, even though a converging tendency may be observed in the various laws.
It is only to be expected that these differences in court organization and in the
definition of delinquency have made for wide variations in juvenile court policies
and practices. Some juvenile courts are rigid, others are flexible; some are authoritarian, others are permissive; some are dictatorial, others are democratic. These
contrasts are reflected in the number of cases heard unofficially in comparison with
those heard officially, as well as in the use of various dispositions and the differences
among juvenile court judges in the use of the dispositions available to them. But
above all, they are reflected by the dominance of the image, as either a legal or social
agency, that the juvenile court has of itself.
II
Tim SOCIAL-AGENCY IMAGE OF THE COURT
Juvenile courts in the United States run the gamut from the authoritarian
legalistic tribunal at one extreme to the permissive, social-agency type of organization

at the other. While there is no one juvenile court which coincides completely
12
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with either of these idealized poles, it could probably be demonstrated that those
which are an adjunct to another court correspond more closely to the legalistic
image and those which have a completely independent organization, with a full-time
judge, tend to adhere to the social-agency image. In this part, an attempt will be
made to delineate the ideal social-agency image of the juvenile court. In so doing,
those influences that were crucial in molding this image, the general character of this
image, and some of its unanticipated consequences will be identified.
In the social-agency image, the purposes of the juvenile court are to understand
the child, to diagnose his difficulty, to treat his condition, and to fit him back into
the community. These purposes are held, to a greater or lesser degree, by the
personnel that constitutes the juvenile court organization. More difficult, however,
is the unraveling of all the tangible and intangible influences that have gone into
constructing this social-agency image. In this connection, five influences have been
selected which, in the judgment of the writer, have been primarily responsible for
the evolution of this image and for its development at the expense of the juvenile
court's more legalistic role. These are and have been: (i) the aggressive social-work
orientation of the United States Children's Bureau; (2) the broadening jurisdiction
of the juvenile court to include not only neglected and dependent children, but all
matters of a legal nature involving children; (3)the gradual professionalization of
social work; (4)various court decisions involving delinquency; and (5)the growing
prospects of treatment through the increased acceptance by social workers of psychoanalysis, which has provided techniques for getting at the roots of conflict which
supposedly produce delinquency. While each one of these influences has played its
specific role, it would be quite difficult to assess their respective weights. It is
sufficient merely to note that collectively they interacted and mutually reinforced an
image of the juvenile court as a social-agency institution of independent status.
Thirteen years after the first juvenile court was established in Illinois, the
Children's Bureau was created and lodged in the United States Department of
Labor.' 3 The appointment of Julia Lathrop, an early proponent of the first juvenile
court law, as its first head was a significant factor in enabling the emerging profession of social work to exercise a powerful influence over the development of the
juvenile court. This influence has been reflected in the collection of statistics, the
development of model juvenile court laws, the promulgation of standards for measuring juvenile court operation, the initiation of studies of juvenile court cases, the
encouragement of juvenile courts to institute treatment services, the calling of
national conferences of practicing professionals dealing with the problem, the
emphasis on the need of probation officers with case-work training, and the attempts
to construct educational and experience standards for those persons who would enter
juvenile court work. All of these efforts and others have helped so to orient the
juvenile court as to enable it to construct an image of itself as a social-work agency,
designed primarily to meet the needs of the child. When Julia Lathrop left the
is37 STAT. 79 (1912), 42 U.S.C. § 191 (1952); 37 Str. 737 (1913), 5 U.S.C. § 616 (1952).
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Bureau in i92i, the high standards which she had set and the high ideals of child

care and welfare for which she strived were carried forward by the distinguished
social workers that followed her-Grace Abbott, i921-33, Katherine Lenroot, x934-5i,
and Martha Eliot, I951-56.

In short, the Children's Bureau, during its comparatively short history, has been
most successful in shaping the image of the juvenile court as an agency for seeking
the welfare of the child. Its failures, if they may be so termed, have been primarily
of a negative nature-that is, it has failed to recognize that high ideals without
sufficient knowledge are not enough, with the consequence that the social-agency
image, which is at present the dominant image, has led to certain unanticipated
consequences and unresolved dilemmas which have often placed the child in situations that are harmful rather than helpful to him. One commentator probably had
these matters in mind when he noted that "the plight of the youngster has been
increased by the deprivation of these [public hearings, trial by jury, right of appeal]
and other ordinary elements of due process that are assured in the criminal court."' 4
The second influence, the broadening jurisdiction of the juvenile court, was a
natural outgrowth of the reform spirit which dominated its founding. This helped,
again, to emphasize the often-quoted characteristic of the juvenile court-that the
child before it is not being tried for a crime, but rather that the court is acting in
lieu of the parent and, as a benevolent one, by inquiring into the development and
circumstances surrounding his maladjustment in order to determine the course of
action that will best meet his needs and insure his continued welfare. This tendency
of the juvenile court to deal with all cases involving children, however, has resulted
in an obscuring and sloughing over of the differences between the delinquent and
the dependent or neglected child and in a dealing with every child as if he were
maladjusted or presented some kind of a problem. Social workers, in fact, in their
conception of juvenile courts, unwittingly reflect this obscuring tendency :1r
The purpose of the juvenile court is not to inflict a penalty on a child but to save him
from further delinquency and from neglect. Its success, therefore, depends upon a comprehensive understanding of all significant aspects of the case.
*

If treatment is to be directed to causes and adapted to the needs of the individual,

the child himself must be studied-his physical condition, his mental capacities, his personality and the driving forces of his conduct.

It seems only too dear. The purpose of the juvenile court is not to determine
whether the child has committed any act for which he should be held; rather it is
to get at the causes of his misbehavior in order that he can be given treatment appropriate to his needs.
The growth and establishment of social-work practice on a professional level has
been a third influence that has helped to strengthen the social-agency image of the
juvenile court. During the forty years following the birth of the juvenile court, the
"Tappan,
1
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growth of social work was rapid. In the colleges and universities, social work, often
lodged in sociology departments, gradually broke away to form independent departments; in some universities, it emerged as a full-fledged, degree-granting graduate

professional school. The professional organizations for social workers kept pace.
The American Association of Social Workers, an outgrowth of the National Social
Workers Exchange, was founded in 192i, the American Association of Medical Social
Workers in 1918, the National Association of School of Social Workers in

1919,

the

American Association of Psychiatric Social Workers in 1926, the American Association of Group Workers in 1946, and the Social Work Research Group in x949.
Within the last three years, all of these groups have joined to form the National
Association of Social Workers. These professional organizations not only have
helped to support the hands of those strategically-placed workers in the Children's
Bureau, but also have served as pressure groups in various communities to bring
about the appointment of the type of juvenile court personnel that would strengthen
the social-agency image of the court.
The fourth influence here-certain court decisions-have also helped to move
the juvenile court toward a social-agency image. The constitutionality of the legislation creating the juvenile court was quick to be tested. In one of the earliest of
these cases, Commonwealth v. Fisher, the defendant attacked the juvenile court
and its procedures, claiming that he had been deprived thereby of certain of his.
constitutional rights. The court stated in part:1
The last reason to be noticed why the act should be declared unconstitutional is that it
denies the appellant a trial by jury. Here again is the fallacy that he was tried by the
court . . . and no act of the legislature can deny this right to any citizen, young or old,
minor or adult, if he is to be tried for a crime against the commonwealth. But there
was no trial for any crime here, and the act is operative only when there is to be no,
trial. The very purpose of the act is to prevent a trial....

And so it went. Decision after decision helped to mold an image of the
juvenile court that departed farther and farther from traditional legal principles. At
the time, various criticisms were leveled at these decisions. One charge was.
"socialism"; another, more reasoned, was that they were merely in keeping with

a certain popular support that the new laws enjoyed. In any event, these decisions
provided solid support for interpreting the laws to the end of converting the juvenile
court into a kind of social agency.
Perhaps, the most outstanding influence impelling the juvenile court towards its
social-agency self-image has been the early recognition that a child brought before
the court must be treated for his problem, rather than be punished for his crime.
This attitude supposedly opened the door for "scientific justice," where the child
before the juvenile court would be studied in a total fashion-biological, psychological and sociological; a diagnostic judgment made; and a treatment prescribed
which would meet unfulfilled needs, secure his protection, and insure his return.
"6Commonwealth v. Fisher,

213
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to social and psychological health. Thus, individualization of treatment was to be
achieved in the juvenile court by the convergence of the enthusiastic support of
reformers, the scientific advances in psychology and psychiatry, and the dominant

individualistic theme of our culture.
With this initial treatment-orientation, the medical analogy was quick to appear
in the literature, aided and abetted particularly by the development of psychoanalysis,
with its varieties and the application of its insights into the delinquent child.17
From the study of neuroses and their emotional manifestations, it was, then, but a
short jump to the viewing of delinquent behavior as a symptom of some underlying
emotional conflict.' 8 When this occurred, it followed that each case must be studied
carefully and completely to reach the source of the conflict in the child's personality
that could account for the "acting-out"--even though socially-disapproved-behavior,
and adequate provisions, psychiatric and/or case-work, made for its correction. As
the doctor restores the physically-sick child to health, so it was urged, would the
clinical team of psychiatrist, psychologist, and social worker restore the delinquent
child to behavioral health, where those unpleasant "acting-out" symptoms would
disappear.
As has been pointed out above, this treatment viewpoint has been present from
the very beginning, despite the fact that no technique for treating delinquent behavior had been adequately formulated and tested. Even today, with the many advances of the basic sciences, such techniques are but imperfectly understood and do
not, as many sophisticated therapists have recognized, meet expectations.' 9 In
study after study, this fact has been demonstrated. The fact remains, however, that
during the fifty-nine years since the founding of the juvenile court, the clamor concerning the need for treatment, nature of treatment, correct treatment procedure,
and treatment facilities has continued to fill the pages of the professional journals,
newspaper supplements, and professional lectures on delinquency to various community groups.
While treatment has been discussed here primarily in terms of the application
of psychiatric and case-work techniques, the inference should not be drawn that
these are the only activities regarded as treatment by the juvenile court. The fact
of the matter is that under the impact of the treatment philosophy held by professionals, every action that the juvenile court takes is regarded as "treatment." Whether
the juvenile court sends the child to the reformatory or the clinic, places him on
probation or in a foster home, dismisses him with a lecture or without a lectureall is rationalized as treatment, especially by those professionals who have a deep
1

7 See, e.g., A. A eHORN, WAYWARD YOUTH (1935).

"8 It should be emphasized that the claim is not advanced that delinquency is never the outgrowth
of some emotional condition. It cannot, however, explain all delinquent behavior, as some of the uncritical adherents of the medical analogy seem to imply. The sole purpose here is to show the manner
in which "treatment" philosophy has molded the social-agency image of the juvenile court.
" See Peck, Why Does a Young Delinquent Resist Treatment?, The Child, Nov. 195!, p. 35; Lipp-
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(1945).

JUVENILE COURT

517

need to view the juvenile court as an agency for treatment and never for punishment
of the child.
The social-agency image of the juvenile court has had a dynamic quality-that is,
it has been growing and expanding since the birth of the juvenile court in Illinoisand it is reflected in annual reports of various juvenile courts, in numerous publications of the Children's Bureau, in certain court decisions, and in many articles in
professional and semiprofessional social-work journals. For example, here is a

statement from an annual report of

1925:20

Or as the statute now reads, "The court from time to time may adjourn the hearing
and inquire into the habits, surroundings, conditions and tendencies of the child so as
to enable the court to render such order or judgment as shall best conserve the welfare
of the child and carry out the objects of this act." As a result of this enactment the
justices have been enabled to scrap once and for all the old legal trial of children with
its absurd and obsolete limitations of testimony and to inquire into the causes of the
children's neglect or delinquency untrammelled by narrow rules of evidence.
It is significant to note that the writer has no difficulty in considering delinquency
and neglect together and is perfecdy willing to throw out the "narrow rules of evidence" and the "absurd and obsolete limitations of testimony" in order to get at the
"real causes" of the child's difficulty. It is difficult to refrain from observing, however, that it seems extremely relevant, if only in the interest of fair play, to establish
the fact as to whether or not the child committed a particular act that would make
him delinquent under the existing statute.
In this same report, the judge writes of the future of the court:2 '
We prefer to think of it as a definite arm of the government engaged in the task of protecting and correcting the handicapped children of the community and of supervising their
social adjustments, but not extending its functions over matters which could be administered by other departments of state or even by semi-public agencies without invoking
judicial action. . . Even now the court is seeking to treat every case, in which its assistance is invoked, to the end that the cause of the disease or disorder complained of may be
removed and that its patients may be restored to perfect moral health. As time goes on its
facilities for helping its patients and of achieving their social adjustments will be developed
and improved.... In short the court of tommorrow, as we picture it, will resemble in
many respects the ideal which we are struggling, more or less imperfectly, to obtain today.
It will administer the law faithfully and conscientiously but at the same time its emphasis
will be laid more and more on the exercise of social justice by which alone the children who
come before it may be readjusted, safeguarded and developed into future assets for the
State.
This judge, only too dearly, has been willing to have his legal training modified
or supplemented, as the case may be, by certain conceptions and values derived from
a social-work point of view.
Perhaps, no clearer formulation of this social-agency image of the juvenile court
2'
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(1925).
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is provided than a statement by the Wayne County Juvenile Court made over

fifteen years ago :22
The average citizen thinks of the Juvenile Court in terms of a criminal court for young
boys and girls, and believes that the Detention Home is a jail to which these boys and
girls are sentenced.
These misconceptions overlook the great progress which society has made in the past
one hundred years in dealing with delinquent children. For it is as recent as that, that
children of tender years who violated the criminal laws were locked up in the same jails,
were tried by the same prosecutors and judges, and in many cases received the same
punishment, as hardened adult criminals. Often the punishment consisted of many years'
imprisonment, and even, in a few instances, death. The protest by socially-minded people
against this treatment by the criminal courts of juvenile offenders on the same basis as
adult offenders, resulted in the Juvenile Court movement. Progressive people realized
that the administration of social justice, at least so far as children are concerned, should
not be based on theories of retribution and revenge, but rather on the principles of reformation and correction. They felt that children, by the very reason of their immature years,
cannot and should not be held as strictly accountable for their acts as are adults.
The Juvenile Court is the outcome of this agitation for social justice for children.
It is the first legal tribunal where the law works side by side with the sciences which
deal with human behavior. The Court adopted the social case-work method, by which
the child is treated individually in relation to his whole environment. It is in this
procedure that the Juvenile Court differs from the criminal courts, where an accused
person is sought to be convicted of and punished for having committed a particular
crime. The juvenile delinquents who are brought before the Juvenile Court are not
regarded as criminals, irrespective of the misconduct or offense with which they are
charged. They are considered to be boys and girls who have become maladjusted and,
perhaps through no fault of their own, have expressed their normal feelings and emotions in delinquent ways. The Court recognizes that these children need its special care,
protection and understanding; and through proper supervision and guidance, it endeavors
to divert the forces of delinquent behavior into normal and satisfactory channels.
This statement, which appears to be largely for public-relations purposes, epitomizes
the spirit and aspirations of the juvenile court set in a social-agency framework. It
goes almost without saying that there will be great disparity between actual practice
and this pollyanna view of what the juvenile court aspires to be.
Within this social-agency framework, the juvenile court ideally should function
in the following manner: A complaint would be made to the juvenile court's intake
desk by the police, a social agency, a neighbor, a parent, or a socially-minded citizen.
If the behavior difficulty could not be resolved with the complainant, process would
issue and the child would be brought in. The child and its parents would be
questioned by a social worker, and if the child could be released to its parents, this
would be done; otherwise, the child would be held at a detention home pending a
thorough social study of the case. In this latter event, the child himself would be
variously viewed as maladjusted, having a problem, in trouble, or an example of
need frustration or a type of "acting out" behavior. A social worker then would
be assigned to the case to make the required social study.
22
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Preliminary study of the case might indicate to the worker that the child's
difficulty was not very deep-seated and that the case could be handled unofficially
with a preliminary hearing and dismissed to the best interests of the child and
others who were involved. On the other hand, preliminary inquiry might indicate
the need for a complete social study; and, if so, the study would continue and might
include thorough physical, psychiatric, and psychological examinations, as well as a
thorough developmental picture of the child in his family and/or other social
situation. The social investigation would logically lead to some diagnostic formulation involving the nature of the problem and the probable roots of the difficulty.
On the basis of this formulation, some plan of treatment would be outlined which,
of course, might include "institutional treatment." At this point, again, a decision
would be made as to whether the case could be handled unofficially and recommended
treatment carried out by the juvenile court clinic, child-guidance agency, a family
agency, or a private psychiatrist, or whether the case should be handled officially
and brought before the juvenile court judge, with the understanding that he would
see that the recommended treatment was carried out. In either case, treatment
would continue if the subject proved willing to accept it. If, however, he did not,
more stringent measures would probably be recommended; in fact, the plan might
include any one of the several dispositions, euphemistically called "treatments," that
have been traditionally open to the juvenile court judge-namely, dismissal, supervised probation, foster-home placement, or institutional commitment. The juvenile
,court might also insist that the child be given psychiatric treatment by some independent agency. At this point, social-work supervisors, now termed probation
officers, would take over and follow the child through the prescribed course. In the
ideal social-agency-type juvenile court, however, the great majority of the cases
would tend to be handled "unofficially."
As the juvenile court has moved in the direction of perfecting its social-agency
image, several unforeseen consequences have emerged. For example, court decisions
have helped mold this image as, one after another, they have affirmed that private
hearings, the introduction of social-study material, the absence of a defense attorney,
and the lack of trial by jury do not constitute a denial of due process because the
child is not being tried for a crime. Accordingly, those legal safeguards which
have been the cornerstone of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence for centuries are not
available to the child in the juvenile court because he is considered not to be responsible for his act up to a specified age, depending upon the state law, but rather is
regarded as "having a problem." The disposition of the child in the juvenile court
is, thus, almost entirely dependent upon the wisdom of the judge.
Another consequence of this emerging social-agency image of the juvenile court

has been an attempt, particularly noticeable in the first six postwar years, to hold
parents responsible for the delinquent acts of their child. The underlying reasoning
is this: Social workers, via their varieties of psychoanalytic orientations, have
egarded the home as the fundamental source of the love and security necessary to
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shape the child into a mature adult. When the child is not given this love and
security, he experiences a feeling of frustration and unfulfilled needs, which leads
to distorted and ambivalent reactions to one or both parents, and some resultant deepseated conflict or splintering of his ego. The parents, in turn, owing to their own
inadequacies or because of the emotional state of the child, are able to provide nothing
but the most erratic and inconsistent discipline and supervision. In such a family
atmosphere, accordingly, the child may begin to "act out" his conflicts in delinquent
ways. Now, this all-too-brief statement of the asserted psychological roots of
delinquency in the family setting has been sold to certain juvenile court judges,
with the result that schools for parents have been started, and parents have been
summoned into juvenile court and, in some instances, given jail sentences because
they have, from this perspective, been adjudged responsible for the delinquencies of
their child 2
Another consequence of the juvenile court's assumption of the role of a socialwork agency is that the original differences among the conditions of dependency,
neglect, and delinquency have gradually become obscure, and the juvenile court
has approached each child as a young person who has a problem and needs help,
regardless of his basic condition. It is but a step from this obfuscation to the
general notion that the underlying cause of these diverse conditions is the same,
despite the lack of evidence to support such a position.
A final consequence of this adherence to a social-agency orientation by the juvenile
court-and perhaps the most telling one-is the moral confusion it occasions in both
the child and his parents. In the popular mind, a court is an instrument for securing
justice between persons and for securing the rights of the person charged with a
specific criminal act by the state. When, however, the juvenile court fails directly to
advert to the fact that a particular illegal act has been committed by the child and,
in its zeal to "treat" the child, completely glosses over this matter, the final disposition
of the child's case is very likely to seem to him confusing and even unjust. And his
parents, in turn, will reflect this confusion, because on their social level, they cannot
very easily accept the view that the child by virtue of his behavior is "sick" and needs
"treatment," but rather are committed to the view that the court is there for justice
and for punishing a person who has done something that is wrong.
One critic perceives this situation very clearly when he notes the lack of understanding of parents as to the function of a psychiatric clinic to which the juvenile
court referred their children's cases. He points out that when cases brought before
the juvenile court on charges of incorrigibility were referred to the clinic, the parents
and the child considered the clinic action a part of the punishment for the offense
instead of a means of treatment2 4 Moreover, this attitude on the part of the child
" Space does not permit consideration of this problem in greater detail. The statutes have generally
given judges authority to proceed against a parent or other adult where it can be shown that he has
directly contributed to the delinquency of the child. See TEm-zas AND REI EMANN, op. cit. supra note
6, at 200-06.
" O'Keefe, Mental Hygiene Facilities for the Juvenile Delinquent, Federal Probation, June 1948,
PP. 31-35.
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and his parents will continue to exist and plague the "treatment" process, because
it will generally be impossible for the juvenile court to convey its "scientific" orientation to people whose morality is framed exclusively in terms of right and wrong.
It is also cogent to inquire how far we can carry certain theories of treatment of
criminal behavior, on both juvenile and adult levels, without undermining the concept of legal responsibility; for it should be clear that a popular acceptance of the
idea that no one is responsible for what he does would lead to chaos. Here, confusion is attributable to the deterministic character of science-the attempt to explain
given behavior by isolating the interrelated factors antecedent to it-under which
the doctrine of scientific responsibility replaces that of legal responsibility 5 So,
when the juvenile court attempts to help the child by "treating" his "disorder," it
is literally using the child to collect data to substantiate certain theories of child
behavior and to foist on him some inadequately-tested notions about treatment of
juvenile misconduct, while, at the same time, chipping away at the concept of legal
responsibility.
III
THE LEGAL IMAGE OF THE COURT

It has been observed that the true social-agency image of the juvenile court tends
to emerge only in those few highly-organized, independent juvenile courts to be
found in large cities. The juvenile court as established by law in the great majority
of states, however, is a part of a court of general jurisdiction and, as such, is part
of a county court system. With such legal status, therefore, one can well appreciate
the furious character of the conflict that has been occasioned by efforts to convert
the juvenile court into a type of social agency, with traditional legal procedures deemphasized or eliminated and various treatments introduced in order "to cure" the
child. The conflict has, in fact, been continuous, and in recent years, it has become
even sharper as various studies have indicated both that many basic legal rights are
being denied the child and his parents and that there may be a great gap between
conception and execution of successful treatment of a "maladjusted" child. Thus,
it has been observed that "measured by any reasonable standards the juvenile courts

2
have failed to live up to the high expectations held by the early reformers.
The conventional response to such observations has been that the juvenile court
fails precisely because the community cannot or is unwilling to provide the necessary
resources and facilities to do a first-rate job. Statements to the effect that there
are not enough properly-trained probation officers, the judge is only part-time and
has failed to grasp the juvenile court idea, detention facilities are inadequate, there
are not sufficient treatment facilities in the juvenile court or community, there is a

need for more psychiatric time, the people comprising the community must be edu-

cated to the function of the juvenile court, and the salary scale is inadequate are to
M See Green, The Concept of Responsibility, 33 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 392-94 (943).
.' BLOCII AND FL.NN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 317.
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be found scattered throughout the literature. While any one or all of these shortcomings may exist with respect to any particular juvenile court, however, there is
no evidence convincingly to show that if these defects were remedied, juvenile courts
in general would be able to do a better job in preventing recidivism in children who
had once been found to be delinquent. In fact, much of the evidence appears to be
exactly to the contrary 27 Even so, ameliorative measures might still be justified on
the ground that the juvenile court would be able to perform its social-control function
more adequately and more humanely.
What, then, are some of the central issues in this conflict between the socialagency and the legalistic orientations of the juvenile court?
First, the problem of the extent of jurisdiction of the juvenile court has been
debated on two fronts: what relationship does it bear to other courts; and what type
of cases should legitimately come before it? The problem of the relationship of the
juvenile court to other courts was considered in the often-quoted case of People V.
Lattimore. There, the Illinois Supreme Court reviewed and affirmed the criminal
court conviction of the defendant while she was still a ward of the juvenile court,
upholding the lower court's jurisdiction in these words :28
The juvenile Court is a court of limited jurisdiction. The legislature is without
authority to confer upon an inferior court the power to stay a court created by the constitution from proceeding with the trial of a cause jurisdiction of which is expressly granted
to it by the constitution.. . . It was not intended by the legislature that the juvenile
court should be made a haven of refuge where a delinquent child of the age recognized
by law as capable of committing a crime should be immune from punishment of violating
the criminal laws of the state, committed by such child subsequent to his or her being
declared a delinquent child.
The problem is still widely-debated, however, and generally arises in one form or
another when a child of juvenile-court age commits a capital offense. One solution
has been to make the juvenile court independent by creating state-wide juvenile
courts systems, as has been done in Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Utah. But it
will take more time to determine where this system has improved the administration
of juvenile justice.'
With respect to the types of cases that should come before it, there has been a
tendency throughout its history for the juvenile court to assume jurisdiction over most
cases involving children-often, it is asserted, more than it could satisfactorily handle.
Thus, adoption, unmarried mothers, mother's pension, and sometimes divorce cases
have been lodged in the juvenile court, as it has extended its aegis over cases of
27See

W. HEALY AND A. BRONNER,

TREATMENT AND WHAT HAPPENED AFTERWA.RD

(1939); E,

PownERs AND H. WxTMER, AN ExPERImENT IN THE PREVENION OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: THE CAMBRDGE SOMERvILLE YoUTH STUDY (i951); Dunham and Knauer, The Juvenile Court and Its Relation
to Adult Criminality, 32 SocIAL. FORCES 290 (r954); Diana, Is Casework in Probation Necessary?, Focus,
Jan. 1955,-p. i; Adamson and Dunham, Clinical Treatment of Male Juvenile Delinquency: A Case Study
in Effort and Result, 21 AM. SoCIo. REV. 312 (1956); R. W. England, What Is Responsible for Satisfactory
Probation and Post Probation Outcome?, 47 J. Csime. L., C. & P.S. 667 (1957).
"s
9 People v. Lattimore, ixu N.E. 275, 362 Ill. 2o6 (x935).
See Rubin, State juvenile Court: A New Standard, Focus, July x951, p. 103.
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dependency and neglect as well as delinquency. As noted above, this tends to
confuse the juvenile court's function.
The practice of handling cases unofficially is another matter about which much
controversy has raged over the years. This practice is extremely variable among
juvenile courts, as certain juvenile courts handle no cases unofficially, while others
may handle the bulk of their cases in this manner. The arguments advanced in
support of the practice is that it is in keeping with the juvenile court's basic treatment philosophy; it keeps the child from having a court record; it enables professional opinion other than that of the judge to influence the case; and it saves the
time and energy of the judge for the more serious cases. On the other hand, it is
argued that the practice conduces inefficiency in that it diverts judicial attention to
cases that should be handled by other agencies; it weakens the juvenile court's
authority in the more serious cases; and it confuses any criteria which attempt to
distinguish between court and noncourt cases and discourages other agencies from
developing and devoting their resources to the prevention of delinquency. It almost
goes without saying that the practice makes meaningless any attempt to report
statistical comparisons between communities as to the frequency of delinquency.
Another problem confronting every juvenile court judge is that of balancing the
welfare of the child, in accordance with the juvenile court's basic philosophy, against
the protection of the community. This issue has not been articulated very dearly
in the past, but recently it has received greater attention as it has been brought more
sharply into focus. 0 While it might be argued, in the spirit of Adam Smith's
economic theory, that securing the welfare of the child will insure best the welfare of
the community, this is not likely to have much appeal to those persons who have
been injured in some fashion by the acts of a child. They may demand retribution
and even revenge, which to them is justice. In fact, it is extremely doubtful that the
aims of protecting and securing the welfare of the child can ever be completely
realized until a sizable majority of the people in any community understands and
accepts the basic philosophy of the juvenile court. This widespread lack of public
rapport accounts for the perennial charge that the juvenile court is "coddling young
criminals." Even if the necessary public understanding were brought about, however, the issue would still have to be faced as to how to deal most effectively with
delinquent behavior in achieving both the welfare of the community and that of
the child.
Another problem, as yet not adequately explored, concerns the limitations of individualized treatment within an authoritative court setting. While it has been
accepted by many enlightened persons that punishment per se secures no beneficial
results to the person or to the community, it is also becoming increasingly clear
that our treatment techniques do not accomplish what we would like. In this area,
however, our knowledge is quite deficient. We cannot well distinguish between
'See
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those cases that might benefit from some form of psychotherapy and those cases
that will not. Nor can we distinguish between those cases in which delinquency will,
in any event, be arrested and those in which help is needed. Then, too, no matter
what "treatment" disposition the court may use-probation, foster home-placement,
referral to a treatment clinic, or commitment to an institution-the fact remains that
it is likely to be viewed by the child and his parents as punishment and not treatment, although these devices probably afford a more individualized and progressive
scheme of punishment than various kinds of treatment per se. There is, finally,
some doubt as to the validity of one assumption of treatment philosophy seldom mentioned in the literature-the assumption that the child facing the therapist is either
not thinking or, if he is, he is freely entering into cooperation with the therapist
to achieve a cure. With delinquents, nothing could be farther from reality. For
quite often, the delinquent "patient" is not only thinking, but thinking of how he
can beat this "rap"; and in trying to do so, he will not hesitate to attempt to manipulate the therapist, who will have to be steeped in a knowledge of the delinquent's
world if he is not to be duped.
These issues must all be resolved if the juvenile court is to fulfill a valid legal
function. 3 ' Ideally, the juvenile court would be independent of other courts, with
its jurisdiction carefully defined by law. The law would, for the guidance of the
juvenile court, carefully and precisely define the specific acts for which a child could
be held as a delinquent. At the intake desk, a complaint would be registered with
the appropriate evidence to support the contention that an act of delinquency had
been committed. The gathering of such evidence would be primarily a police task,
in which assistance might perhaps be rendered by a probation officer of the juvenile
court. The probation officer, the police, and the juvenile court referee would decide
whether or not the evidence was sufficient to warrant a delinquency petition. If not,
the child would be dismissed with a warm, friendly attitude; if the evidence was
sufficient, however, the child would be held either in the custody of his parents or
guardian or in a detention home for a juvenile court appearance.
When brought before the juvenile court, after a very short detention period,
the first task of the judge would be to inform the child and his parents of all their
legal rights according to law, particularly their right to legal counsel and appeal.
The judge would then hear the evidence and find whether or not the child had
committed a delinquent act. The judge, before determining the disposition of the
case, would then confer with those professional members of his staff who had
worked on the case to determine if some consensus had been reached among them
as to which available disposition would serve best to secure both the welfare of
the child and protection for the community. He would then pronounce the disposition that had been decided in consultation. Such dispositions even though mild
and humane, would bear a punishment and not a treatment label. The atmosphere
" In constructing this legal image, the focus here is primarily on delinquency cases and excludes other
kinds of cases handled by juvenile courts.
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of the juvenile court at all times would be formal, dignified, and authoritative. The
judge, as representative of community authority, would always attempt to impress
the child and his parents with the gravity of the situation and the consequences
that would likely ensue if such act or acts were repeated. Such a juvenile court
would have no facility for clinical treatment of the child, for it would be recognized
that treatment can be carried on only when a case is not being adjudicated. Nor
would it indulge in the unofficial handling of cases. For it should be clear that if
no delinquent act has been committed, the taking of any action with reference to
the child is a violation of his rights, unless the child and/or his parents request help
-and in that event, he and/or they would be referred to the most appropriate
available agency.

Iv
CoNpicr OF IMAGEs-A NEW OPPORTUNITY

The proponents of these two images-the social-agency and the legalistic-which
have here been delineated have been engaged in ideological battle over the juvenile
court during its sixty years of existence. To be sure, the social-agency image has
been the more dominant and aggressive, although in recent years, the balance has
swung back somewhat toward the legalistic image0 2 The conflict of these images,
however, still clearly appears in juvenile court attitudes and the decisions of the
various judges as they seek to cope with the cases before them. A slight ironical
twist may be seen when an eminent judge describes the juvenile court as comparable
to a hospital or clinic where the "sick" patient is diagnosed, hospitalized, treated, and
discharged,"3 while a well-known social worker states that the juvenile court is first
a court where legal responsibility is established specifically by law with respect to
certain behavior and conditions of children and adults 4
The clash of these two images in the history of the juvenile court has been of
crucial significance, because it tends to force a re-examination of all theories concerning the etiology of delinquent behavior, as well as theories concerning the most
effective ways of handling delinquents to produce the desired results. It has brought
the juvenile court to what one critic, drawing an analogy from the field of mechanics,
has termed "dead center," where no force can move it either way and it slowly
grinds to a dead stopl s Whether "dead center" or some other phrase best describes
the present situation of the juvenile court, however, is beside the point; the fact still
remains that the juvenile court has not demonstrated the accomplishments which
" See, e.g., PAUL W. TAPPAN, ComPAt TivE SURVEY ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (1952); Killian,
The Juvenile Court as an Institution, 261 ANNALS 89 (1949). Over thirty years ago, Eliot saw the need
to separate judicial and treatment functions. See Eliot, The Project Problem Method Applied in
indeterminate Sentence, Probation, and Other Re-educational Treatment, in THE CmLD, Tm CLINIC AND
THE COtmr 102 (1925).
naP. W. Alexander, Of Juvenile Court Justice and Judges, in NPPA YEARBOOK x87, 192 (1947).
' ALICE SCOTT NUTr, TiE JUVENILE COURT AND THE PUBLIC WELFARE AGENCY IN THE CHILD WELFARE PROGRAM (U.S. Children's Bureau, Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare Pub. No. 327, 1949).
" McCrea, Juvenile Courts and Juvenile Probation, 3 N.P.P.A.J. 385 (1957).
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would justify the faith of its founders. But the present situation of the juvenile court
might well afford a unique opportunity-that is, the opportunity to sponsor and
encourage scientific research inquiries to answer some of the pressing questions that
this clish of images has produced. Both the spirit and tradition of the juvenile
court make it possible to do this.
Lack of space limits a detailed discussion here, and so only a few problems suitable
for research can be suggested. There is a great need to determine how the juvenile
court can be made most effective, both as an instrument of social control in the
community and as an instrument for arresting delinquent behavior in youth. Let us
consider this experiment: We hear from many sources that a delinquent child
needs psychological treatment and not punishment. Therefore, let us set up a wellequipped clinic, with the best-qualified personnel that it is possible to obtain, even
at the expense of paying them salaries somewhat higher than the prevailing scales
in the community. When such a clinic is established, from the signed complaints
coming to the juvenile court, one child would go to the clinic for appropriate treatment and one would go to the juvenile court, which would function exclusively as
a legal tribunal, using the dispositions available to it. The clinic would only take
enough cases to insure an adequately-sized sample, previously agreed upon. Two
to three years after treatment, a follow-up study would be made on both juvenile
court and clinic cases, primarily to determine if the subjects still continued their
delinquent behavior or were in any way dependent problems for the community.
The writer strongly suspects that there would be no significant differences in outcome between the juvenile court and clinic cases because of the almost universallyoverlooked fact that clinic treatment may be useful in only certain types of cases.
If the clinic succeeded with certain kinds of cases, they might be hidden in the
figures and would be balanced by those cases in which a favorable adjustment would
have been effected regardless of the disposition made. This suggests that successfully treated cases are those that would recover if nothing were done.
There is need also to determine the relative merits of the different disposals available to the juvenile court and the kind of cases that'might respond most appropriately to each. Similarly, there is need to determine, if possible, the significance of
the impact of the court experience upon the child: Will it be more crucial to certain
children coming from some segments of society than to other children from
other segments? In evaluating each study, a two-faceted standard would be employed: does the child continue his antisocial behavior as an adult; and/or does the
child continue to have a socially-unacceptable dependent status as an adult?
These research suggestions are only a few of the tacks that the juvenile court
might pursue to help ease itself from its present static position. Research might
also promote the divestiture of the built-in egocentric protective mechanisms that
are found in certain juvenile courts and direct attention once again to the problem
of the child and the task of transforming the juvenile court into an effective agency
for the social control of youth.
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There would hardly seem to be any dispute among professionals in the criminological field that a philosophy of treatment and reformation is of a morally
higher order than is a philosophy of punishment; ther e is less certainty, however,
about the views of the general public on this matte'r. But regardless of public
attitudes, the question of how far and under what circumstances the reward-penalty
system of a society can be modified is most crucial. For it would seem that in any
kind of social structure, there will always be certain persons who cannot and will
not be accommodated. Some of these persons will be so-called criminals, and the
central sociological task is to discover, if possible, what their minimum number
should be and then to determine the best social arrangements to keep their number at this level. With respect to juvenile delinquents, this probably represents the
"hard core" which fails to respond to any therapeutic approach.
The juvenile court, most markedly of all our agencies for handling sociallyaberrant individuals, has adhered to the philosophy of treatment and reformation,
with the lofty ideal of safeguarding, almost at any cost, the welfare of the child.
While this ideal is eminently praiseworthy and expressive of the humanitarian
quality of American culture, the question can, however, and should be raised as
to whether the existing social-agency-type juvenile court has succeeded in creating
the most appropriate conditions for arresting a child's misconduct and for providing
him with those personality strengths that will enable him to adjust to the community in a socially acceptable manner. This is a question, it is submitted, that
merits the most careful and thoughtful examination.
In this paper an attempt has been made to portray two idealized conceptions of
the juvenile court-the social-agency and the legalistic-the nature of the conflict
between them, and the resultant state of rigidity into which it has become frozen.
While the social-agency image has been the most dominant and aggressive, the
legalistic image still remains with us in many juvenile courts, hidden in the
traditions of the criminal law. The future of the juvenile court hinges upon our
capacity to analyze carefully the issues in this conflict in order that we may devise the
type of institutional procedure-in conformity with our existing knowledge-that
will best insure both protection for the community and essential personality strengths
for our youth.

